In what is an ultimately very sad case involving the stillborn birth of a baby to a barely teenage girl, the Court of Appeals found that neither the assignment of the matter to the State under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act or Indiana’s paternity statutes, provided an avenue for the State to bring an action to establish paternity. Here, the mother simply wanted to confirm who the father of her child was and was not seeking any other benefit or monetary amount.
Since Title IV-D’s purpose is to enforce support obligations and the paternity statutes are there to provide “proper care, maintenance, education, protection, support and opportunities” to the child, there was no interest or authority for the State to file an action for paternity. This did not mean, however, the mother could not do so on her own.
The CoA’s opinion is filed in the ever-expanding catalog of cases relating to under-insured motorist (“UIM”) coverage.
The issue is relevant in light of the Indiana Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Justice v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 4 N.E.3d 1171, 2014 Ind. LEXIS 196 (Ind. 2014). In fact, the Court of Appeals relies on that decision in reaching its conclusion here.
In this case, the spectacularly surnamed Christine Anderson was in a motor vehicle accident during the course of her employment. The at-fault driver had $25,000 in coverage, which was paid in full, and Anderson received $81,166.15 in worker’s compensation (“WC”) benefits since she was on the job. She had at the time a UIM policy with limits of $100,000. Thus, she sought $75,000 for the remaining UIM coverage.
Indiana Insurance argued that the UIM policy limit was set off by the WC benefit since it exceeded the $75,000 in remianing UIM coverage. This would mean that coverage would be reduced from the policy limits rather than the total damages (e.g. if Anderson had $300,000 in damages, she argues that the amount she received in WC benefits should be deducted from the $300 number instead of the $75K in coverage).
The Court of Appeals sided with Indiana Insurance on this point, holding that policies generally provide for when a setoff is to be made against damages rather than limits of liability and the use of the word damages in other areas of the policy is evidence that the insurer did not intend for the setoff to apply to damages if another word is used.
Paragraph E mentions “element of loss” and does not mention damages. Further, the portion of the Policy addressing underinsured motorists coverage uses the term “damages” on other occasions. Also, similar to Am. Econ., Paragraph E falls under the section titled “LIMIT OF LIABILITY.” Unlike Tate, the Policy defines an “[u]nderinsured motor vehicle” as one for which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds or policies applicable at the time of the accident is either: “1. Less than the limit of liability for this coverage; or 2. Reduced by payments to persons, other than ‘insureds’, injured in the accident to less than the limit of liability for this coverage.” Appellant’s Appendix at 163. Based upon Paragraph E, we cannot say that the trial court erred to the extent that it reduced the amount Anderson received from worker’s compensation from the Policy limit.
The Court of Appeals did however hold that under the recently published Justice case, the insurer could not apply WC benefits to reduce the UIM benefit below the state mandated minimum of $50,000. In citing that case, the Court found the following language dispositive: “[i]f [the underinsured motorist] had carried the required amount of liability insurance, [the insured] would have received $50,000, and the purpose of our uninsured/underinsured motorist statute is to put him in that position.” 4 N.E.3d at 1179. Thus, no matter whatever the WC benefit Anderson received, she was entitled to $50,000 in UIM coverage.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment by the trial court on the issue of the setoff but reversed summary judgment on the issue of the recoverable UIM benefit.
Bad faith finding reversed where there was no obligation to produce evidence detrimental to Plaintiff
At trial on a UIM claim, GEICO’s counsel found out days before the trial that one of the plaintiffs, a doctor, had been charged with obtaining controlled substances by fraud in Florida. The information was raised on cross examination of that plaintiff. After a verdict for one of the other plaintiffs, plaintiffs moved for a finding of bad faith for not presenting the evidence before trial, pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1. The trial court granted the motion and GEICO appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that there was no discovery request for the information compounded by the fact that the plaintiff doctor knew of the information and elected not to disclose it to his attorney.
IN CoA reversed grant of summary judgment in favor of original homeowner and against tax deed purchaser. Purchaser of tax deed was required only to send notice via certified mail, not request a return green or follow up on service, to provide notice of redemption period and then to provide notice that redemption period has expired. Such service was deemed constitutionally sufficient to provide notice.
In action to suspend driver’s licenses of two judgment defendants, trial court did not err in amending judgment to installment payments and reinstating driving privileges of said defendants under Ind. Code § 9-25-6-6. Trial court also had discretion to make the installment longer than 7 years even though statute permits suspension of driving privileges only within 7 years of failure to satisfy judgment. Statute was clear and unambiguous and did not set time limit on installment payments.
See McGee v. McGee, 998 N.E.2d 270, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“[I]t is as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.”). If we were to interpret the statute in the manner in which NIPSCO suggests, we would be adding a requirement to the statute that is not there. We cannot and will not do that. See id. at 272.
Indiana Department of Education removed TOPS from its list of approved SES providers. TOPS appealed the determination and the DOE sent a letter affirming the decision. The letter did not contain any factual findings regarding its decision, nor did it reference any other document that would contain such findings. TOPS then filed for judicial review and the DOE moved to dismiss, stating that the letter was a final order and thus TOPS was obligated to submit the entire agency file to the trial court for review. The trial court granted the motion and TOPS appealed.
While the CoA admonished TOPS for not attaching the entire file for judicial review, it was not fatal to TOPS’s case. In fact, TOPS’s oversight was minimal compared to the DOE’s. In a strange bout of “let’s hope no one notices,” the DOE attempted to argue on appeal that the order was not final but rather “purported” order, even though the basis for dismissal at the trial level was that the order was final, thereby necessitating TOPS to attach the entire record. The CoA caught the inconsistency and ruled that DOE did not argue this to the trial court and therefore could not raise the argument for the first time on appeal. The DOE had advanced the argument because a final order is indeed required to contain findings of fact.
Under AOPA, a final order by an administrative agency must present written findings of fact, including ‘findings of ultimate fact . . . accompanied by a concise statement of the underlying basic facts of record to support the findings’ as well as ‘conclusions of law for all aspects of the order.’ Pack v. Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 935 N.E.2d 1218, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Ind. Code § 4-21.5-3- 27(b) & (c)).
Thus, the cause was remanded to the administrative level where the DOE will be given the opportunity to support its decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law.